Packet Forwarding Strategies in Multiagent Systems: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Abstract EN

In multiagent systems (MASs), agents need to forward packets to each other to accomplish a target task.

In this paper, we study packet forwarding among agents using evolutionary game theory under the mechanisms of Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA).

Packet forwarding among agents plays a key role to stabilize the whole MAS.

We study the transfer probability of packet forwarding of agents at the idle state or the busy state and computer the probability of the packet forwarding for a MAS.

When agents make their decisions to select Forward or No-Forward strategy, a packet forwarding evolutionary game model is built to reflect the utilities of different packet forwarding strategies.

Two incentive mechanisms are introduced into the game model.

One is to motivate agents to strengthen cooperation; the other is to encourage agents to select the No-Forward strategy to save energy while they are in the busy state.

The parameter value that encourages an agent to select the No-Forward strategy is inversely proportional to the average probability of the packet forwarding.

The replicator dynamics of agent packet forwarding strategy evolution are given.

We propose and prove the theorems indicating that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) can be attained.

The results of simulation experiments verify the correctness of the proposed theorems and the effects of the two incentive mechanisms and the probability of packet forwarding, which assures the robustness of evolutionary stable points among agents in MASs.