دراسة تحليلية لبعض حلول المباريات المتعددة الأطراف

Abstract EN

This study aims at exploring the ways of solving n-person games, be it cooperative where coalitions are formed or non-cooperative where there is no cooperation among all the game players.

We explore the Nash Equilibrium and the Shapley values as one of the non-cooperative and cooperative games respectively.

The study finds out that the Nash Equilibrium is a satisfying solution to all the game players so that any diversion from Nash Equilibrium leads to reducing the players' returns as a whole.

That is why, it is a satisfying solution to them all.

Whereas, if the players decide to cooperate, this will not lead to changing the overall result of the game.

Yet the players' returns change according to the change of the coalition nature where coalition does not please any player only if this adds to his/her returns.

Yet the Shapley values give each player a return according to his/her contribution in the games returns through the distinguished function compared with the other solutions.