A robust secure self-certified concurrent signature scheme from bilinear pairings

Abstract EN

The idea of concurrent signature schemes is that two parties produce two respective ambiguous signatures that are concurrently bound to their corresponding signatories only while either of the party releases a keystone.

The main construct is that both parties need to reach a consensus on the true fairness in mutually exchanging the signatures, and, moreover, the protocols assume that there is no collusion between a trusted third party and any of the parties.

However, by collaborating over business interests with the participants as strategic partners, the trusted third party may obtain access to sensitive key data held in escrow, leading them to the collusion attack associated with malicious intentions.

To circumvent the misbehavior among the participating individuals, an identity authentication process can be used prior to exchanging or having access to any confidential information.

In this paper, we propose a self-certified concurrent signature from bilinear pairings as an alternative solution to strengthen the security level for solving the fair exchange problem.

Apart from resisting to the collusion attack, the proposed scheme provides the advanced security properties to prevent from the message substitution, the identity forgery and impersonation, and other generic attacks in an increasingly insecure network environment.