Being in Aristotle and Avicenna : from the multiplicity of essence to the unity of existence

Abstract EN

This paper evolves around the question of the possibility of constructing a theoretical understanding of being that reflects, objectively, its primary instance.

My answer is negative because there is, in my view, an elementary pre-theoretic temporal understanding that grounds any philosophic formulation of the content of the concept of being.

To support my claim, I compare two interpretations of the meaning of being, that of Aristotle and that of Avicenna.

The upshot is that each of them grounds his final conceptualization of the primary instance of being on a specific elementary understanding of what the proper instance of being must be.

Another significant result is that each of the indicated elementary concept of being seems to reflect a specific attitude toward the world of experience and its epistemic value, one (that of Aristotle) appreciate it, the other (that of Avicenna) does not.

Here, in my opinion, resides a serious problem: Avicenna’s failure to consider the world of experience a legitimate and reliable “road” that can lead us to the recognition of a more fundamental form of reality.

It is timely to reconsider Avicenna’s influential “rational” approach to the concept of being with a different perspective.