الحرية التعاقدية، حق أساسي ؟: قراءة في نصوص القانون التونسي

Abstract EN

A fundamental right has the Constitution for cradle and its hoe is the public law.

Which makes his access to private law and getting closer of contractual freedom impossible, if we recall "Rohm": "The wall separating the two branches of law is more robust than the Berlin Wall".

It should also be recognized that the encounter between "contractual freedom" and "fundamental right" is not a simple matter because of a spice- time difference.

The "fundamental right" (the young man)-in contrast to contractual freedom, which was likened to the old woman is a modern concept.

But transcending the barriers of time and space seems to be an urgent need, perhaps because this is evidence of interaction with the phenomenon of "constitutionality," which has been known for years by some comparative systems.

Perhaps a new reading of contractual freedom has come, in the light of the constitution, but rather in the light of supra-legislative texts in general.

Such a reading may require tracing the fundamentality of contractual freedom.

But highlighting the essential nature of contractual freedom cannot be the most goals.

Rather, it should also be concerned with the consequences of the fundamentality of contractual freedom, and most importantly, in the end, it should be wary of freedom "if its restrictions are loosened, it will itself become a fetter for a greater freedom than it¹".