القبول المانع من الطعن في الأحكام القضائية وفقا لقانون أصول المحاكمات المدنية الأردني

Abstract EN

This study that treats (The Acceptance that Inhibits from Appealing in Judicial Decisions) is divided into two chapters : the first one is devoted to explain the theory of the acceptance that inhibits from appealing.

Thus, this study clarifies the legal nature of acceptance, distinguishes it from other concepts and determines its various types.

The second chapter elaborated the effects of the acceptance that inhibits from appealing; thus we discuss the authority of the Court on the existence of the acceptance and then we talked about the scope of this acceptance in terms of the type of judgments and the subject matter case, the effect of the acceptance issued by one of the case parties and the effect of the invalidity of the judgment or actions on which the acceptance was based upon, and I finally spoke about the acceptance that does not inhibits an accessory appeal.

The study showed that the “Acceptance that Inhibits from Appealing” is a unilateral judicial act as well as a procedural one that the right holder is entitled to use on the condition that he has full capacity without any vice of consent and based on a legitimate cause.

This study also showed that the accepting the judgment can precede or follow the release of the judgment can be express or implicit, but the court will decide whether the given act is considered to be an acceptance or not, and the court can conclude the acceptance if there were reasonable reason for that.

However, the acceptance cannot be presumed.

Thus accepting the judgment creates a plea in favor of the adversary for not accepting the appeal1, and another plea that is res judicata prohibiting from rising the same case.

Both of these pleas are considered to be a public order the court can raise them by its own.

Accepting an accessory judgment, will prohibit from appealing this judgment alone, but accepting the main judgment, prohibits from appealing the main judgment and the rest of the accessory judgments.

Accepting the judgment from one of the sentenced will have its juridical effects only on the one who accepted the judgment, without effecting the others, even if the case was indivisible or even if it concerned an obligation of solidarity.

The precedent acceptance creates its effects even if the judgment was invalid, or based upon invalid procedures; unless the invalidity was a matter of a public order.

On the other hand the latter acceptance will not produce its effects unless the issuance of the court was based on valid procedures; otherwise it is possible to make an appeal.

The acceptance that is about a public order issue will never produce any effect, but we must note that accepting the judgment does not prevent from make an accessory appeal if the acceptance took place before the major appeal.