A Study of Network Violator Interception Based on a Reliable Game Model

Abstract EN

This study focuses on planning interceptor locations in a general transportation network to maximize the expected benefits from catching violators mixing in public traveler flow.

Two reliability-related characteristics are also integrated into the planning model to make it more practical.

One is that each interceptor (e.g., a sensor or a checkpoint) has a failure probability.

The second is the existence of a “game” between the interceptor planner and violators.

A nonlinear nonconvex binary integer programming model is presented.

We develop a simulated annealing (SA) algorithm to solve this model, and numerical experiments are conducted to illustrate the computational efficiency of the proposed algorithm.

We also analyze the sensitivity of the disruption probability of interceptors to optimal objective function values and discuss how to determine the values of these parameters in a violator route choice model.