Perfect Equilibria in Replies in Multiplayer Bargaining
Author
Source
Journal of Applied Mathematics
Issue
Vol. 2013, Issue 2013 (31 Dec. 2013), pp.1-10, 10 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2013-12-18
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
10
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
Multiplayer bargaining is a game in which all possible divisions are equilibrium outcomes.
This paper presents the classical subgame perfect equilibria strategies and analyses their weak robustness, namely, the use of weakly dominated strategies.
The paper then develops a refined equilibrium concept, based on trembling hand perfection applied only on the replies, in order to overcome such weakness.
Concluding that none of the classical equilibrium strategies survives the imposition of the extrarobustness and albeit using more complex strategies, the equilibrium outcomes do not change.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Carvalho, Luís. 2013. Perfect Equilibria in Replies in Multiplayer Bargaining. Journal of Applied Mathematics،Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-457248
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Carvalho, Luís. Perfect Equilibria in Replies in Multiplayer Bargaining. Journal of Applied Mathematics No. 2013 (2013), pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-457248
American Medical Association (AMA)
Carvalho, Luís. Perfect Equilibria in Replies in Multiplayer Bargaining. Journal of Applied Mathematics. 2013. Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-457248
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-457248