A Theory of Farsightedness in Committee Games

Abstract EN

We study the committee decision making process using game theory.

A committee here refers to any group of people who have to select one option from a given set of alternatives under a specified rule.

Shenoy (1980) introduced two solution concepts, namely, the one-core and a version of bargaining set for committee games.

Shortcomings of these solutions concepts are raised and discussed in this paper.

These shortcomings are resolved by introducing two new solutions concepts: the farsighted one-core and the bargaining set revised, inspired by an idea of farsightedness initially defined by Rubinstein (1980).

It is shown that the farsighted one-core is always non-empty and is better than the one-core.

In a well-specified sense, the bargaining set revised is also better than the bargaining set as defined by Shenoy (1980) and it is always non-empty for simple committee games with linear preferences.

Other attractive properties are also proved.