Bluffing as a Rational Strategy in a Simple Poker-Like Game Model
Joint Authors
Vilone, Daniele
Guazzini, Andrea
Source
Issue
Vol. 2013, Issue 2013 (31 Dec. 2013), pp.1-6, 6 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2013-06-04
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
6
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
We present a simple adaptive learning model of a poker-like game, by means of which we show how a bluffing strategy emerges very naturally and can also be rational and evolutionarily stable.
Despite their very simple learning algorithms, agents learn to bluff, and the most bluffing player is usually the winner.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Guazzini, Andrea& Vilone, Daniele. 2013. Bluffing as a Rational Strategy in a Simple Poker-Like Game Model. Journal of Complex Systems،Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-6.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-468323
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Guazzini, Andrea& Vilone, Daniele. Bluffing as a Rational Strategy in a Simple Poker-Like Game Model. Journal of Complex Systems No. 2013 (2013), pp.1-6.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-468323
American Medical Association (AMA)
Guazzini, Andrea& Vilone, Daniele. Bluffing as a Rational Strategy in a Simple Poker-Like Game Model. Journal of Complex Systems. 2013. Vol. 2013, no. 2013, pp.1-6.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-468323
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-468323
