Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions
Author
Source
ISRN Computational Mathematics
Issue
Vol. 2012, Issue 2012 (31 Dec. 2012), pp.1-8, 8 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2011-11-24
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
8
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
We will constructively prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions.
The proof is based on the existence of approximate Nash equilibria which is proved by Sperner's lemma.
We follow the Bishop-style constructive mathematics.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Tanaka, Yasuhito. 2011. Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions. ISRN Computational Mathematics،Vol. 2012, no. 2012, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-473226
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Tanaka, Yasuhito. Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions. ISRN Computational Mathematics No. 2012 (2012), pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-473226
American Medical Association (AMA)
Tanaka, Yasuhito. Constructive Proof of the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in a Finite Strategic Game with Sequentially Locally Nonconstant Payoff Functions. ISRN Computational Mathematics. 2011. Vol. 2012, no. 2012, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-473226
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-473226
