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Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms with Asymmetric Costs
Author
Source
Issue
Vol. 2014, Issue 2014 (31 Dec. 2014), pp.1-10, 10 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2014-07-13
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
10
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
Both demand and cost asymmetries are considered in oligopoly model with managerial delegation.
It shows that (i) both efficient and inefficient firms with delegation have second move advantage under quantity setting and first move advantage under price competition; (ii) the extended games under both quantity and price competition have subgame equilibria.
Lastly, the social welfare of all strategy combinations is considered to find that when the efficient firm moves first and the inefficient firm moves second under price competition, the social welfare can be higher than Bertrand case, if the efficiency gap between the two firms is huge.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Wang, Leonard F. S.. 2014. Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms with Asymmetric Costs. Game Theory،Vol. 2014, no. 2014, pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-486630
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Wang, Leonard F. S.. Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms with Asymmetric Costs. Game Theory No. 2014 (2014), pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-486630
American Medical Association (AMA)
Wang, Leonard F. S.. Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms with Asymmetric Costs. Game Theory. 2014. Vol. 2014, no. 2014, pp.1-10.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-486630
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-486630