Complexity of a Duopoly Game in the Electricity Market with Delayed Bounded Rationality

Abstract EN

According to a triopoly game model in the electricity market with bounded rational players, a new Cournot duopoly game model with delayed bounded rationality is established.

The model is closer to the reality of the electricity market and worth spreading in oligopoly.

By using the theory of bifurcations of dynamical systems, local stable region of Nash equilibrium point is obtained.

Its complex dynamics is demonstrated by means of the largest Lyapunov exponent, bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits, and fractal dimensions.

Since the output adjustment speed parameters are varied, the stability of Nash equilibrium gives rise to complex dynamics such as cycles of higher order and chaos.

Furthermore, by using the straight-line stabilization method, the chaos can be eliminated.

This paper has an important theoretical and practical significance to the electricity market under the background of developing new energy.