Matthew Effect of the Random Drift on the Evolution of Cooperation
Joint Authors
Source
Mathematical Problems in Engineering
Issue
Vol. 2014, Issue 2014 (31 Dec. 2014), pp.1-8, 8 p.
Publisher
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
Publication Date
2014-02-16
Country of Publication
Egypt
No. of Pages
8
Main Subjects
Abstract EN
The effect of the random drift on the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game is studied on regular lattices.
A new evolutionary rule is proposed, which stochastically combines the deterministic rule with the random drift rule.
It is found that the random drift has an effect on the evolutionary dynamics depending on the values of the temptation-to-defect b and the probability p of the random drift.
When the random drift occurs with low probabilities, which interests us more, a phenomenon of the Matthew effect on the evolution of cooperation is found.
Explanations of this phenomenon are deduced through the analysis on the dynamics and pattern formations of the PDG system.
American Psychological Association (APA)
Liu, Chao& Li, Rong. 2014. Matthew Effect of the Random Drift on the Evolution of Cooperation. Mathematical Problems in Engineering،Vol. 2014, no. 2014, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-494128
Modern Language Association (MLA)
Liu, Chao& Li, Rong. Matthew Effect of the Random Drift on the Evolution of Cooperation. Mathematical Problems in Engineering No. 2014 (2014), pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-494128
American Medical Association (AMA)
Liu, Chao& Li, Rong. Matthew Effect of the Random Drift on the Evolution of Cooperation. Mathematical Problems in Engineering. 2014. Vol. 2014, no. 2014, pp.1-8.
https://search.emarefa.net/detail/BIM-494128
Data Type
Journal Articles
Language
English
Notes
Includes bibliographical references
Record ID
BIM-494128