Renegotiation Perfection in Infinite Games

Abstract EN

We study the dynamic structure of equilibria in game theory.

Allowing players in a game the opportunity to renegotiate, or switch to a feasible and Pareto superior equilibrium, can lead to welfare gains.

However, in an extensive-form game this can also make it more difficult to enforce punishment strategies, leading to the question of which equilibria are feasible after all.

This paper attempts to resolve that question by presenting the first definition of renegotiation-proofness in general games.

This new concept, the renegotiation perfect set, satisfies five axioms.

The first three axioms—namely Rationality, Consistency, and Internal Stability—characterize weakly renegotiation-proof sets.

There is a natural generalized tournament defined on the class of all WRP sets, and the final two axioms—External Stability and Optimality—pick a unique “winner” from this tournament.

The tournament solution concept employed, termed the catalog, is based on Dutta’s minimal covering set and can be applied to many settings other than renegotiation.

It is shown that the renegotiation perfection concept is an extension of the standard renegotiation-proof definition for finite games, introduced by (Benoit and Krishna 1993), and that it captures the notion of a strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium as defined by (Farrell and Maskin 1989).