Conservative Intensional Extension of Tarski's Semantics

Abstract EN

We considered an extension of the first-order logic (FOL) by Bealer's intensional abstraction operator.

Contemporary use of the term “intension” derives from the traditional logical Frege-Russell doctrine that an idea (logic formula) has both an extension and an intension.

Although there is divergence in formulation, it is accepted that the “extension” of an idea consists of the subjects to which the idea applies, and the “intension” consists of the attributes implied by the idea.

From the Montague's point of view, the meaning of an idea can be considered as particular extensions in different possible worlds.

In the case of standard FOL, we obtain a commutative homomorphic diagram, which is valid in each given possible world of an intensional FOL: from a free algebra of the FOL syntax, into its intensional algebra of concepts, and, successively, into an extensional relational algebra (different from Cylindric algebras).

Then we show that this composition corresponds to the Tarski's interpretation of the standard extensional FOL in this possible world.