Online Cooperative Promotion and Cost Sharing Policy under Supply Chain Competition

Abstract EN

This paper studies online cooperative promotion and cost sharing decisions in competing supply chains.

We consider a model of one B2C e-commerce platform and two supply chains each consisting of a supplier and an online retailer.

The problem is studied using a multistage game.

Firstly, the e-commerce platform carries out the cooperative promotion and sets the magnitude of markdown (the value of e-coupon).

Secondly, each retailer and his supplier determine the fraction of promotional cost sharing when they have different bargaining power.

Lastly, the retailers decide whether to participate in the cooperative promotion campaign.

We show that the retailers are likely to participate in the promotion if consumers become more price-sensitive.

However, it does not imply that the retailers can benefit from the price promotion; the promotion decision game resembles the classical prisoner’s dilemma game.

The retailers and suppliers can benefit from the cooperative promotion by designing an appropriate cost sharing contract.

For a supply chain, the bargaining power between supplier and retailer, consumer price sensitivity, and competition intensity affect the fraction of the promotional cost sharing.

We also find that equilibrium value of e-coupon set by the e-commerce platform is not optimal for all the parties.