Two versions of interactionism

Abstract EN

The central aim of this paper is to compare and evaluate two versions of mind-body interactionism advocated by René Descartes (1596-1650), the French rationalist, and John C.

Eccles (1903-1997), the Nobel Prize-winning neurophysiologist.

The paper is divided into three parts; part one explores the main features of Cartesian mind-body interactionism and the role of passions in maintaining the union of the mind and body.

The insurmountable difficulties facing the Cartesian position, and the alternative monistic position adopted by Benedict de Spinoza (1677-1632) are addressed in part two.

Part Three examines Eccles’s contemporary theory of mind-brain interactionism.

It is argued that Eccles’s version of interactionism did not successfully overcome the problems arising from Cartesian interactionism.

Eccles’s theory based upon scientific analysis faces the same difficulty that Descartes’s interactionism had to deal with : how the immaterial can affect the material.