British intervention in Afghanistan and its aftermath (1838-1842)‎

Abstract EN

The balance of power that prompted the European powers to the political domination and economic exploitation of the Third World countries in the nineteenth century was primarily due to the industrialization requirements.

In fact, these powers embarked on global expansion to the detriment of fragile states in Africa, South America and Asia, to secure markets to keep their machinery turning.

In Central Asia, the competition for supremacy and influence involved Britain and Russia, then two hegemonic powers in the region.

Russia’s steady expansion southwards was to cause British mounting concern, for such a systematic enlargement would, in the long term, jeopardize British efforts to protect India, ‘the Crown Jewel.’ In their attempt to cope with such contingent circumstances, the British colonial administration believed that making of Afghanistan a buffer state between India and Russia, would halt Russian expansion.

Because this latter policy did not deter the Russians’ southwards extension, Britain sought to forge friendly relations with the Afghan Amir, Dost Mohammad.

However, the Russians were to alter these amicable relations, through the frequent visits of their political agents to Kabul.

This Russian attitude was to increase British anxiety to such a degree that it developed to some sort of paranoia, which ultimately led to British repeated armed interventions in Afghanistan.